Dr Dave Leal & Prof Roger Crisp
One argument for God’s existence relies on the claim that theism does a better job than naturalism of accommodating objective moral facts. I’m assessing whether that claim is true. Key to this is assessing what the implications are if there is a conceptual gap between moral claims and non-moral claims (like claims about God, or the natural world). The implications of conceptual gaps have been discussed in philosophy of mind with respect to apparent gaps between claims about physical states and claims about conscious states. I draw on this discussion to make headway on the moral case.
I have a MPhil in Philosophical Theology from Oxford University, a MA in Philosophy of Health and Happiness from Birmingham University, and a BA in Philosophy with Creative Writing from Staffordshire University.
Smith, M. 2018. “In Defence of the Argument for Emotional Assent,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol 55, no 1, pp. 51-62.
Philosophy of religion, meta-ethics, philosophy of mind
Academic Related Activities:
I am the secretary of the Joseph Butler Society, a philosophy of religion society.
Areas of Teaching Competence and Experience:
Philosophy of religion, philosophical theology.